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GENETIC TESTING FOR
SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DISEASE FROM
EXPOSURE TO TOXIC CHEMICALS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC AND
WORKER HEALTH POLICIES
Michael Baram"
ABSTRACT: The Environmental Genome Program intends to identify "susceptibility
genes" that would indicate if a person is more vulnerable to cancer or other disease as a
result of exposure to certain chemicals in the workplace, the environment, foods, or other
products. Research findings and the capability to test persons for such genes are likely to
impugn and challenge health policies and regulatory programs that do not take genetic
susceptibility into account when conferring health benefits and restricting chemical
exposures. This article focuses on the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and discusses four options available to this agency for protecting genetically
susceptible workers and the issues involved in designing and implementing each option.
The options involve amending each workplace chemical standard to incorporate genetic
testing in amedically supervised program akin to OSHA's Lead Standard, generic revision
of all standards so they are sufficiently stringent to protect susceptible workers, requiring
information dissemination to prompt management and workforce initiatives, and
incorporating genetic susceptibility in holding employers accountable to OSHA's "general
duty clause."

*Michael Baram is Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
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I. PREDICTIVE GENETIC TESTING
The Human Genome Project and associated research activities are leading to
the development of numerous tests for human "disease genes." These genetic
tests analyze chromosomes, DNA, RNA, genes, and gene products to determine
whether an alteration or other anomaly is causing or is likely to cause a specific
disease or condition.'
Growing public demand and commercial interests have stimulated the rush
to develop and use genetic tests for three main purposes: to diagnose persons
who exhibit disease symptoms, to determine if persons who are currently
asymptomatic carry disease genes that could be imparted to offspring, and to
determine if asymptomatic persons are at increased risk of a hereditary disease.
The public expects that medical interventions will quickly follow to mitigate, cure,
or prevent many hereditary afflictions and illnesses caused by somatic mutations.
Despite the absence of regulatory safeguards for assuring that such tests
have clinical validity and utility, and despite cautions from geneticists that
extensive research is needed before the predictive value and reliability of many
such tests are scientifically established, tests for over 300 genetic diseases are
now available for clinical use.2
The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (SACGT), created
by the Department of Health and Human Services in 1998, serves as the principal
advisory group to the federal government on technical and policy aspects of
genetic testing. It has sought to balance its support for advances in genetic
testing with various precautions. In its report on the Adequacy of Oversight of
Genetic Tests, SACGT warns: "It is critical for the public to understand that while
genetic tests can be extremely beneficial, they can also pose risks, including
medical and psychological risks, risks to families, and social and economic risks
that may affect entire groups as well as individuals .... "'
More specifically, SACGT warns ofthe "therapeutic gap" whereby "effective
treatments are not available for many diseases now being diagnosed or predicted
through genetic tests." 4 SACGT also warns of medical risks arising from actions
taken in response to genetic tests, such as prophylactic surgery, psychological,

1. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETIC TESTING, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH,
ADEQUACY OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (Apr. 12,2000), http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/gtdocuments.html.

2. Id. at 3, 9.
3. Id. at4.
4. Id. at 5-7.
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and emotional risks of despair following positive test results, and risks of social
stigmatization, discrimination, and familial problems.'
Nevertheless, genetic testing is proliferating, utilizing findings about gene
sequences of "high penetrance," i.e., those sequences found to have "clear and
direct phenotypic implications, in many different individuals and in a wide variety
of environments," such as the sequences associated with Huntington's disease
and Tay-Sachs disease.6 Each of these sequences "has a very direct causal
connection with a specific dysfunction" but is of low incidence in the
population. 7
Following closely on the heels of the Human Genome Project is the federally
sponsored Environmental Genome Project (EGP), which "aims to better understand the genetic basis of differential responses to environmental exposures"
because "[t]he vast majority of diseases, many forms of cancer, for example, are
the consequences of both environmental and genetic contributions" and
"understanding the relationships between genetic variation and response to
environmental exposure is important for understanding the causes of human
disease and is crucial for the development of effective disease-prevention
strategies." 8
EGP research is focused on identifying common "low penetrance" gene
sequences that are believed to "play some role in disease or disease susceptibility, but only in conjunction with other genetic components [or] environmental
exposures." 9 Finding such relationships poses "much more uncertainty" than
connections between high penetrance sequences and hereditary disease." In
addition to research-advancing objectives, the EGP intends to use its findings "to
promote... efforts aimed at improving public health," including "earlier diagnosis
of disease, and more effective disease-prevention strategies.""

II. PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
EGP-DERIVED KNOWLEDGE
EGP research is being conducted to determine disease susceptibilities arising
from the conjunction of low penetrance genes and exposure to particular
environmental contaminants. For example, one project reports that "[a]t least three

5. Id.
6. Richard R. Sharp & J. Carl Barrett, The Environmental Genome Project and Bioethics,
9 KENNEDY INST. ETHIcs J. 175, 177 (1999).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 176.
9. Id.
at 177.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 178. Discerning "the molecular basis for environmentally induced diseases" is
a goal of the Strategic Plan 2000 of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences.
NIEHS STRATEGIC PLAN 2000, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A306 (July 2000).
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polymorphic genes have been identified that potentially can influence the
bioaccumulation and toxicokinetics of lead in humans," and suggests that
"genetically susceptible individuals may not be fully protected by current
regulatory standards." 2 Consistent with EGP goals, the researchers posit that
"[b]etter understanding of genetic factors could have significant ramifications for
' 3
public health and intervention initiatives ... and change public health policy.'
The ramifications for public health policy are significant. Each susceptibility
gene that is found will, in theory, indicate the existence of an asymptomatic
subset of the population that is especially vulnerable to exposure to chemical
pollutants. This will impugn many federal standards intended to protect public
and worker health from hazardous chemicals and will discredit agency regulatory
programs. It also will create public anxieties because of uncertainty as to which
persons are in vulnerable subgroups. If such persons are identified through largescale testing programs, they will express more intense anxieties and outrage if
government-funded therapeutic interventions are not available or government
does not act to reduce exposure levels by setting and enforcing more stringent
standards, shutting down the sources of the pollutants, or providing other
safeguards. Public pressure, petitions, and litigation probably will ensue, forcing
agencies to reconsider many regulations and facility permits. Agencies will need
to somehow accommodate conflicting principles of equal protection and utility in
their decisions for protecting genetically susceptible subgroups. 4
Thus, governmental programs that are essential to public health policy will
be challenged, particularly those that regulate the introduction of potentially
hazardous products (such as pesticides, food additives, and pharmaceuticals) into
commerce and those designed to confer public health benefits (such as Medicare,
lead paint removal, and toxic waste cleanup). The relevance of susceptibility
genes to these programs will be apparent and will require changes in decision
criteria to adjust utilitarian considerations (e.g., cost-benefit analysis) to meet
demands by susceptible groups for equivalent protection or increased benefits
based on equal protection and humanitarian considerations. For example, the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), struggling to contain the
escalating costs of the Medicare program it administers, will need to consider
whether the costs of testing the elderly for susceptibility genes and subsequent
therapeutic interventions for reducing the likelihood of their future illness are to

12. Ava 0. Onalaja & Luz Claudio, Genetic Susceptibilityto Lead Poisoning,108 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 23 (Supp. I Mar. 2000).

13. Id.
14. See Carl Cranor, Eggshell Skulls and Loss of Hairfrom Fright: Some Moral and
Legal Principles that Protect Susceptible Subpopulations, 4 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY

&

PHARMACOLOGY 239 (1997). Agencies face similar challenges in protecting children and in
protecting minorities from disproportionate environmental risks.
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be covered. Thus far, HCFA criteria essentially limit Medicare coverage to
diagnosis and treatment of actual illness. 5
In addition, public health policy is shaped by state programs, private sector
systems and arrangements, and litigation. These include state workers'
compensation programs, litigation under state common law doctrines, corporate
risk management, and private insurance for health care. Knowledge about
susceptibility genes will be injected into these contexts as well.
Insurers can be expected to be eager to use estimates of the incidence of
susceptibility genes in pricing workers' compensation, third party liability, and
various health insurance coverages. Such knowledge would reduce uncertainty
in estimating risk and claims and thereby enable insurers to do more accurate and
profitable pricing of policies. Requiring that individual applicants for certain types
of insurance undergo testing for such genes would further reduce uncertainty and
enhance profits, although considerable public pressure against testing individuals may build and lead to statutory prohibitions. 6
Knowledge about susceptibility genes is also likely to be used in various
types of corporate risk management and loss control programs. Manufacturers of
chemical products will use such knowledge for amplifying product warnings and
7
educating customers to prevent harms and avoid products liability lawsuits.1
Companies can be expected to want to conduct susceptibility gene tests on
employees in chemical workplaces or at facilities in polluted regions to hire the
most resistant workers and avoid workers' compensation claims. Although the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits pre-employment medical testing,
it permits job function capability testing after a job offer is made to discern
disability and determine whether "reasonable accommodation" should be
provided by the employer. 8
In toxic tort lawsuits, genetic susceptibility evidence will be introduced to
establish or refute causation and fault. Likewise, in workers' compensation
hearings it will be introduced to address causation and injury job-relatedness.
Community residents will use the information in opposing facilities that would
generate chemical pollutants, and they may regard promises of facility compliance
with existing standards as inadequate.

15. See Health Care Financing Administration, Quality of Care Information; Coverage
Policies; Clinical Diagnostic Laboratory Tests; Addendum A: Introduction to National
Coverage Policies for Diagnostic Laboratory Tests (June 2, 1999) (on file with author).
16. See Michael Baram, The Laws of Genetics, 105 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 488, 488
(May 1997).
17.

See

STEWARDSHIP

CHEMICAL
CODE

MANUFACTURERS
OF

MANAGEMENT

ASS'N,

RESPONSIBLE

PRACTICES

CARE:

(1993),

PRODUCT

http://www.

americanchemistry.com.
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994); see also EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 902 (1995).
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As these examples indicate, EGP findings will be injected into many of the
disparate elements of public health policy. Knowledge of a particular susceptibility gene and an estimate of its incidence in the population served by a regulatory
or benefits program will be sufficient, without testing the individual members of
the population, for justifying reconsideration of regulations or benefits criteria.
Similarly, revising workers' compensation and devising warnings for chemical
products will be feasible without the need to test individuals. Thus, concerns
about testing individuals, such as privacy, anxiety, medical risk, or stigma will not
arise as direct consequences of such generic uses of genetic susceptibility
knowledge. However, as noted earlier, reconsidering regulations or benefits
criteria to assure equivalent health to susceptible subgroups will require artful
adaptation of the utilitarian policies and analyses involved in agency decisionmaking processes. In addition, if the subgroup is composed largely of persons
belonging to a racial or ethnic minority, agency failure to take action that would
eliminate their disproportionate risk from chemical exposure could be construed
20
19
as a violation of environmental justice and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
Other elements of public health policy involve decisionmaking about
individuals, such as plaintiffs in toxic tort suits, claimants in workers' compensation hearings, applicants for health insurance, and insured persons seeking
indemnification from Medicare or other insurers. In these contexts, genetic
susceptibility may be considered essential information and necessitate individual
testing. Testing for low penetrance susceptibility genes may result in medical and
psychological risks, and dissemination of test results may bring about discrimination in employment and stigma for individuals found to be genetically susceptible
to chemical risks. Whereas some of these problems may be effectively addressed
by legal doctrines for protecting privacy and statutes and policies for assuring
genetic privacy and preventing genetic discrimination,2 ' there is no legal

19. See Michael Baram, Electromagnetic Fields: Health Risks and Environmental
Justice, 13 Toxics LAW REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 623 (Oct. 7, 1998).
20.42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1994).
21. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000). Attempts by
state legislatures to address issues of genetic privacy have been limited in scope and lack
comparative consistency. See Natalie A. Stepanuk, Genetic Information and Third Party
Access to Information: New Jersey's PioneeringLegislation as a Model for Federal Privacy
Protection of Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1115-16 (1998); David M.
Studdert, Direct Contracts,DataSharing andEmployee Risk Selection: New Stakes for Patient
Privacy in Tomorrow's Health Insurance Markets, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 233, 256 (1999).
Although many states have enacted or plan to enact genetic discrimination statutes, most of
these statutes address only the use of genetic information by insurers, while only a small
minority of states have adopted legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination by employers.
See Tara L. Rachinsky, Genetic Testing: Toward a Comprehensive Policy to Prevent Genetic
Discriminationin the Workplace, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 575, 587 (2000). States with
existing statutes prohibiting genetic discrimination by employers include New Jersey, N.J. REV.
STAT. § 10:5-12 (N.J. 1997); Hawaii, H.R. 1372, 20th Leg. (Haw. 1999); Kansas, S. 22, 78th
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safeguard against emotional risk and stigma. Thus, individuals seeking monetary
benefits and remedies in these contexts will assume certain risks for which there
is no effective legal recourse when they voluntarily undergo testing.

III. GENETIC SUSCEPTIBILITY
AND OSHA REGULATION
Genetic susceptibility knowledge will have major implications for regulatory
programs which aim to protect human health from chemical exposures. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the emission of hazardous air
pollutants,22 drinking water quality,23 pesticides,24 and other toxic substances, 25
based, in part, on analyses of human exposure and response to the chemicals
involved. Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food
additives 26 and pharmaceuticals, 27 and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulates toxic substances in the workplace28 and
enforces the duty of employers to furnish to employees "employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards. ' 29 Although the statutes
mandating these programs provide differing criteria for determining safety, each
statute requires consideration of relevant facts regarding human exposure and
response to chemical pollutants or products. Therefore, these agencies must
consider knowledge of genetic susceptibility in setting standards.
Thus far, EPA and FDA have not enacted general policies for addressing
genetic susceptibility, nor have they enacted standards that rely on human
testing for implementation. OSHA also lacks a general policy, but for almost two
decades it has required biological monitoring of workers to implement its
standards for several workplace toxins. Biological monitoring usually involves
testing a person's urine, blood, or other bodily fluids to determine that person's
uptake and concentration of a specific toxin.
For example, OSHA's lead standard3" "requires employers to measure
workers' blood lead levels regularly. If the measured concentration of lead in the
blood exceeds certain limits, the worker must be removed from further exposure

Leg. (Kan. 1999); Nevada, S. 16, 70th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1999); and Texas S. 538, 76th Leg.
(Tex. 1999).
22.42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994)
23.42 U.S.C. § 300f (2000).
24. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 1361, 1360 (1994).
25. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
26. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994).
27.21 U.S.C. § 351 (1994).
28.29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1999) (general duty clause).
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1999) (general industry); 29 C.F.R. § 1926.62 (1999)
(construction industry).
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to lead until the level drops to an acceptable value. For up to 18 months, the
employer must maintain the worker's wages and seniority status even if the
person cannot perform his or her regular job."'
Implementation of the standard in Massachusetts, for example, involves a
medical surveillance program under which the employer pays for the medical and
testing services involved, notifies employees of test results, and retains medical
and exposure records. In addition, the "medical supervisor" of the program
provides the employer with test results, a brief medical report indicating whether
tested employees are at increased risk, and recommendations for limiting further
lead exposure as appropriate. However, the program precludes employer use of
prophylactic chelation as a means of preventing lead concentrations in workers,
because this would shift the burden of health protection from employers to
employees.32 Thus, an elaborate legal framework governs use of biological
monitoring under the OSHA lead standard. This framework is designed to ensure
that testing is medically supervised, that management and workers are informed
of test results, that workers at risk are medically removed or given other
protections and retain job status and pay, and that management retains the
burden of assuring worker health.
Such programs provide OSHA with relevant experience for requiring genetic
testing in protecting workers from chemical risks. As OSHA's Director of Health
Standards has observed, "[g]enetic monitoring can be viewed as an extension of
other types of biological monitoring ... to detect biological changes or assess
individual exposures that could be associated with increased risk of occupational
disease."33
Periodic genetic monitoring would not be required to determine which
workers are genetically susceptible to a particular chemical, but a single test
would need to be performed on each employee.34 Thereafter, biological or ambient

31. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PREVENTING ILLNESS AND
INJURY IN THE WORKPLACE 92 (1985).
32. See OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, MASSACHUSETr
DEPT.
PUB. HEALTH, MEDICAL GUIDELINES & MODEL CONTRACT FOR A LEAD MEDICAL PROGRAM

(June 1997).
33. Anita Shill, Genetic Information in the Workplace: Applications and Prohibitions
4 (Apr. 7) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMMING,

OSHA,

INSTRUCTION

STD

1-23.4, OSHA

MEDICAL

SURVEILLANCE

(1980), available at http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc/
Directivedata/STD_1-23_4.html (indicates that compilation of an employee's medical
history may include genetic and environmental facts, but does not prescribe genetic testing).
34. To avoid charges of genetic discrimination and violation of the ADA, which
precludes pre-employment testing of job applicants, the testing would have to take place after
hiring. See Pat Phibbs, Toxicogenetic Testing More Practical with Finding on Number of
Genes in Genome, 31 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 153 (Feb. 22, 2001) (discussing EEOC v.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co., No. 01-4013 (N.D. Iowa filed Feb. 9, 2001)
REGULATIONS-GENETIC

TESTING
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monitoring for chemical exposure would have to be conducted periodically to
determine when the identified susceptible workers reach unacceptable risk
thresholds. For such monitoring of chemical exposure, the lead-standard
framework then could be applied to assure that management and workers are fully
informed, that records are retained, and that medically informed protective
measures are carried out."
In lieu of incorporating genetic susceptibility testing and associated
monitoring into each of its workplace standards for toxic chemicals, OSHA could
use knowledge of genetic susceptibility to make each standard so stringent that
it protects even the subsets of genetically susceptible workers. Although this
would obviate the need for genetically testing individual workers, OSHA
standards must be technically and economically feasible. 6 Extremely stringent
standards to protect the genetically susceptible are not likely to meet these
criteria. In addition, such a standard set for safeguarding a very small subgroup
of susceptible workers would be vulnerable if challenged as an impermissible
deviation from the Supreme Court's rough "instruction" that OSHA regulation be
confined to risks that are "significant," i.e., a lifetime risk of one in a thousand or
greater, but not one in a million. 7
In addition, OSHA could rely on informational regulation for bringing genetic
susceptibility knowledge to the attention of management and workers. This could
be accomplished by amending its Hazard Communication Standard (HCS).3" HCS
requires chemical manufacturers to identify hazardous chemicals they sell to
industrial customers, to label containers of such chemicals with appropriate
warnings, and to prepare a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for each such
chemical, which includes a description of its hazardous attributes, such as toxicity
and carcinogenicity, and instructions for protecting worker health when using the
chemical. It must then be provided to all downstream employers who purchase the
chemicals. Thereafter, the HCS requires such employers and manufacturers to
notify their own employees of MSDS availability, make the MSDSs readily
accessible to them, and provide training about the hazards and safe use of the
chemicals, including appropriate measures for self-protection.
The substantive content of the informational requirements is left to each
manufacturer 3 Assurance that MSDSs will be sufficiently informative is provided

(regarding genetic testing of Burlington employees for genetic susceptibility to carpal tunnel
syndrome)).
35. This scenario assumes the accuracy and validity of testing for susceptibility genes and
of biological and ambient monitoring for chemical exposures.
36. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 542 (1981).
37. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 641
(1980).
38.29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1999).
39. See Michael Baram, Generic Strategiesfor Protecting Worker Health and Safety, in
LAW AND THE WORKPLACE
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to some extent by manufacturers' concerns that inadequacies could lead to
downstream worker illnesses and trigger product liability suits against them.
Assurance that employers will have sufficiently instructive MSDSs and training
materials is similarly provided by competition among manufacturers for customers.
The more a manufacturer can do to help a customer company efficiently comply
with the HCS, the more likely it is that customer loyalty to the manufacturer will
accrue. As a result, many manufacturers voluntarily amplify MSDSs with
additional helpful information and provide training materials and other guidance
for customer use. Thus, liability doctrines and market forces combine to promote
compliance with the HCS.40
Another significant feature of the HCS is the absence of any OSHA
exemptions for hazardous chemicals that pose a de minimis risk to worker health.
OSHA's rationale for not affording such exemptions is that manufacturers have
no way of knowing how downstream customers use the chemicals and cannot
determine if downstream use will pose only a de minimis risk. Thus, they should
not be led by OSHA to rely on de minimis risk because this could lead to
preventable harms and manufacturer liability. 4 Courts have upheld OSHA's
position.
OSHA amendment ofthe HCS, or new guidance for its implementation, could
bring about incorporation of genetic susceptibility knowledge in MSDSs and
training programs. This option would shift the burden of using such knowledge
onto industry and is likely to encounter less resistance because it is not as
prescriptive as revised standards and lead-like medical programs would be.
Implementation would be driven by OSHA enforcement of the HCS, manufacturer
concerns about potential products liability suits, and manufacturer competition
for customers. Discriminatory implications could be contained by other
legislation, such as the ADA. However, it could lead to further burden-shifting,
as employers would likely seek to have their susceptible workers take new selfprotective measures that are disproportionately burdensome or disadvantageous
(such as wearing "moon suits" and other cumbersome personal protective gear),
unless OSHA or collective bargaining intervenes.
Finally, OSHA could forgo any standard-revising or HCS-amending and rely
instead on the general duty clause (GDC) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, which provides that each employer "shall furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious harm to his employees." 42
This brief statement has been construed by OSHA, its review commission, and
the courts as a duty imposed by Congress on private sector employers,
enforceable by OSHA without any need for further rulemaking. OSHA is

40. Id.at 74-75.
41. Id.at 74 (citing General Carbon v. OSHA, 1988 WL 17401 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
42.29 U.S.C. § 654 (1994).
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authorized to inspect private workplaces, question employees, issue citations, and
impose penalties if it finds violations. Because the GDC is ambiguous, however,
OSHA enforcement has sparked controversy and many appeals over several
decades. Courts have held that the GDC establishes fault-based liability, not strict
liability, for employers who fail to eliminate a workplace hazard that is "recognized," "serious," and "abatable by feasible means."43
OSHA defines a "hazard" as "a danger which threatens physical harm to
employees." A hazard is "serious" when its "likely" consequences include "death
or serious physical harm" such as chronic illnesses "which require the passage
of a substantial time period to occur."" The hazard is "recognized" if it is known
to the employer or its employees, or persons who are knowledgeable about or
belong to the same industrial sector. Thus, an employer can be found in violation
of the GDC on the basis of actual or imputed knowledge.45 OSHA must also prove
"there was feasible means by which the employer could have eliminated or
materially reduced the hazard," 46 which remains a matter of considerable
ambiguity.47
Finally, the courts have held that Congress intended the GDC to be a "gapfiller," an obligation to be imposed on an employer only when an OSHA standard
is not available to abate the hazard at issue. Thus, employers cited for GDC
violations frequently argue that an existing OSHA standard preempts GDC
applicability, even when the standard inadequately addresses the hazard in
question. This has led to judicial modification of this preemption doctrine in such
cases. In InternationalUnion v. General Dynamics Land Systems Division,48 the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that:
If... an employer knows a particular safety standard is inadequate to protect
his workers against the specific hazard it is intended to address, or that the
conditions in his place of employment are such that the safety standard will not
adequately deal with the hazards to which his employees are exposed, he has
duty under [the GDC] to take whatever measures may be required by the Act,
over and above those mandated by the safety standard, to safeguard his workers
....Scienter is the key.

43. See Baram, supranote 39, at 69-73.
44. See OSHA, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, DIRECTIVE, CPL 2.45B, CH-3 (1992), available at
http://www.osha-slc.gov/OshDoc/Directivedata/CPL 2 45B CH-4.html.
45. Imputed knowledge can come from MSDSs and other warnings provided by chemical
or equipment suppliers, consultant and expert studies, other experience in the same industrial
sector, industry voluntary standards, and studies or reports by unions, workers and insurers. Id.
See also National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1267 (D.C. Cir 1973).
46. Duricon Co. v. OSHRC, 750 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1984). Congress has referred to this
decision as the most appropriate judicial interpretation of its general duty mandate. See S.
Rep. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 208, 209 (1989).
47. See Baram, supranote 39, at 71-72.
48. 815 F.2d 1570, 1577 (D.C. Cir 1987), cert. denied,484 U.S. 976 (1987).
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Thus, OSHA can carry out a GDC-based strategy for putting genetic
susceptibility knowledge to use. This would call for the agency to broadly
publicize genetic susceptibility knowledge and its relevance to preventing
workplace health hazards, identify and notify the types of firms and industrial
sectors where such hazards are likely because of the chemicals being used, devise
and implement an inspection program, and take appropriate enforcement actions
for GDC violations arising from an employer's failure to act on genetic knowledge
to prevent harm to its susceptible workers. Seemingly simplistic and more
attractive than incurring the burdens of revising specific chemical standards, this
approach would fail unless OSHA is able to produce evidence that susceptible
workers were indeed present, chemically exposed, and not sufficiently protected
in the cited employers' workplaces. Thus, the GDC strategy would ultimately
depend on finding susceptible workers, which necessitates testing the exposed
workforce for susceptibility genes.
In sum, OSHA has several options for putting genetic susceptibility
knowledge to use in protecting worker health, but each option poses difficult
issues for the agency. Similar difficulties exist for EPA and FDA. Nevertheless,
given the proven ability of agencies to absorb and accommodate new scientific
findings and the inevitability that genetic susceptibility knowledge will become
more reliable, agencies need to begin to develop strategies for incorporating such
knowledge and to seek participation from all stakeholders in this important
undertaking.
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